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Picking Up the Slackline: Can the United States and Japan
Successfully Regulate Commercial Fishing of Bluefin Tuna
Following Failed Intergovernmental Attempts?
SARAH E. BAUER*
INTRODUCTION
Bluefin tuna is widely regarded as one of the most highly evolved sea species on
the planet.1 Nicknamed the “Porsche of the Ocean,” Bluefin tuna can be roughly
the same size, and match the same speeds, as a sports car.2 Historically, they have
reached a somewhat mythological status for this size and speed—the Romans
included depictions of Bluefin on their currency,3 Carl Linnaeus named it the “tuna
of tunas” upon classifying the species for the first time, and Ernest Hemingway
once called it “the king of all fish.”4
Bluefin tuna5 were once abundant in the western Atlantic and Mediterranean,
but in recent years, Bluefin stocks have been depleted worldwide.6 This is largely
due to the fact that the Bluefin is not only as big and as fast as a Porsche—it is also
just as valuable. Since sushi became a worldwide phenomenon and the demand for
Bluefin meat skyrocketed, a medium-sized Bluefin tuna can sell for $10,000 to
$20,0007 in certain markets, with bigger fish going for as much as $150,000 each.8
As a result, it is one of the most aggressively overfished species in the oceans. As
of 2009, the number of Bluefin tuna left in the western Atlantic was down 82
percent from its levels in the 1960s,9 while populations of Pacific Bluefin dropped

*
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instruction. I dedicate this Note to Charlie Beeker and his team at the Indiana University Office
of Underwater Science for their tireless ocean conservation efforts—and to my parents, for
supporting my oceanic exploration dreams in a landlocked state.
1
See, e.g., SUSHI: THE GLOBAL CATCH (Sakana Film Productions 2012) (statement of
Mike Sutton, head of the Center for the Future of the Oceans).
2
Id.
3
Juliet Eilperin, U.S. Backs International Trade Ban on Atlantic Bluefin Tuna, WASH.
POST (Mar. 4, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/03/
AR2010030301436.html [https://perma.cc/R8DF-SG27].
4
Kenneth Brower, Quicksilver, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, Mar. 2014, available at http://ngm.
nationalgeographic.com/2014/03/bluefin-tuna/brower-text [https://perma.cc/LYH4-D28U].
5
“Bluefin tuna” is used generally to refer to multiple species of the same genus; for the
purposes of this Note, “Bluefin” indicates either the Atlantic or Pacific Bluefin.
6
See, e.g., id.; infra text accompanying notes 9–12.
7
See Brower, supra note 4 (noting that while extremely high Bluefin prices can
sometimes be attributed to traditional Japanese bidding wars on markets’ opening days, the
average price for medium-sized fish is relatively stable).
8
Patrick Reis, U.S. Backs Proposed Trading Ban on Bluefin Tuna, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/03/03/03greenwire-us-backs-proposed-tradingban-on-bluefin-tuna-74803.html [https://perma.cc/M78L-E7QT].
9
Barry Estabrook, The Last of the Bluefin Tuna?, ATLANTIC (Nov. 13, 2009),
http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2009/11/the-last-of-the-bluefin-tuna/30112/
[https://perma.cc/NLJ3-EPMC] (discussing international failures to protect Bluefin stock).
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by approximately 96 percent.10 Some estimates say there are now only 9000 total
Bluefin left in North America’s stock.11 Perhaps more distressingly, 90 percent of the
Bluefin on the market last year were juveniles that had not yet reproduced.12 The Pew
Environmental Group has long called for a suspension in the commercial fishing of
the species to allow it time to recover, though there is some concern that it is too late
for such measures.13 The Pacific Bluefin was added to the International Union for the
Conservation of Nature red list of threatened species in November of 2014.14
Since the 1960s, international organizations have attempted to protect Bluefin
from overfishing.15 For various reasons, however, these attempts at
intergovernmental regulation have failed spectacularly, leading environmental
groups to call on individual nations to take up the mantle.16 Due to their joint status
as the world’s largest consumers of Bluefin tuna,17 the United States and Japan are
potentially the two nations most able to save the species from extinction. To
determine whether these countries can implement effective regulations to make up
for a lack of intergovernmental success, however, multiple elements must be
considered. First, the very nature of the respective countries’ markets and the
regulatory bodies they have in place are factors in determining whether these
countries are candidates for successful governmental regulation. Second, their
governments’ historical stances on commercial fishing regulation, both for the
Bluefin and for other species, are perhaps the best marker for whether proper
regulation, enforcement, and compliance can be expected from the nations called
on to prevent Bluefin overfishing.
Part I of this Note will address the reasons why intergovernmental organizations
have failed to adequately regulate the commercial fishing of Bluefin tuna. Part II
offers an analysis of the Bluefin markets in the United States and Japan and argues
that these countries are ideal candidates for successful Bluefin regulation because
of their market structures. Part III explores the likelihood that the two countries
would implement such regulations, taking into account the respective governments’
histories of species-specific regulation.

10
Louise Gray, Days After Bluefin Tuna Sells for £1m Conservationists Warn Species Is
Dying Out, TELEGRAPH (Jan. 9, 2013), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/earth/earthnews/
9790478/Days-after-bluefin-tuna-sells-for-1m-conservationists-warn-species-is-dyingout.html [https://perma.cc/6NBQ-ZVGT].
11
Paul Greenberg, Tuna’s End, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (June 22, 2010) http://www.nytimes.com/
2010/06/27/magazine/27Tuna-t.html [https://perma.cc/5VF6-8RMR].
12
Gray, supra note 10.
13
Greenburg, supra note 11.
14
Adam Vaughan & Eric Hilaire, Red List: The World’s Most Threatened Species –
Interactive, GUARDIAN (Nov. 16, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/nginteractive/2014/nov/17/red-list-the-worlds-most-threatened-species-interactive
[https://perma.cc/4JE8-T27T]. Pacific Bluefin had previously been categorized as fish of
“least concern.” Id. The change in status indicates that the species is now threatened with
extinction. Id.
15
Estabrook, supra note 9.
16
See infra Part I.
17
Greenberg, supra note 11.
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I. THE FAILURE OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
Maritime law concerning fishing in the high seas was originally based on
principles laid out in Hugo Grotius’s 1609 treatise “Mare Liberum,” which
essentially recommended free use of oceans by all.18 Such free use has clearly
become untenable as various species are overfished to the threat of extinction.19
Instead, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) now
defines the rights and responsibilities of various nations with respect to their ability
to use the oceans.20 One regulation prescribed by UNCLOS is the exclusive
economic zone (EEZ). EEZs stretch for two hundred nautical miles out from a
country’s coastline, and while they do confer special rights, they do not confer full
sovereignty.21 Most Bluefin are fished in EEZs, and the clash between the “special
rights” of the territorial country and the rights of others to fish in such areas gave
rise to various multinational agreements.22 Even when Bluefin are in one nation’s
territorial waters, they generally remain under the “foggy international jurisdiction”
of certain tuna treaties.23
In the last forty years, the high seas have largely been regulated by eighteen
regional fisheries-management organizations.24 These organizations are
“consensus-oriented,” where politics reign and poor quotas are set in order to
finalize any type of deal.25 Member countries have equal status and voting rights,
despite widely varying interests in the regions’ fishing trade.26 Quotas are the most
popular form of regulation to come out of these intergovernmental bodies, and they
are generally unreliable because of rampant illegal fishing and the unwillingness of
consuming nations to track trade accurately.27
Recently, the U.N. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
(CITES), the Convention on Biological Diversity, and the Inter-American Tropical
Tuna Commission (IATTC) have convened to discuss the overfishing of Bluefin
tuna. The IATTC has been generally ineffective, the Convention on Biological
Diversity in Japan amounted to little more than “words . . . not translated into
action,”28 and CITES simply delegated its authority to the International

18

Id. (discussing the reasons for creating intergovernmental regulatory bodies).
Gaia Vince, How the World’s Oceans Could Be Running Out of Fish, BBC (Sep. 21,
2012), http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20120920-are-we-running-out-of-fish
[https://perma.cc/2MJJ-YQYH].
20
Id.
21
Only territorial waters confer full sovereignty; EEZs instead allow “special rights” that are
limited to areas below the surface of the sea. Surface waters are still considered international
waters. See generally Greenberg, supra note 11; United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
22
Greenberg, supra note 11.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
See infra text accompanying notes 37–43.
28
Oliver Knowles, ICCAT Fails to Protect Bluefin Tuna, GREENPEACE INT’L (Nov. 27,
2010), http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/news/Blogs/makingwaves/iccat-fails-toprotect-bluefin-tuna/blog/29151/ [https://perma.cc/9WKP-FFEU]. Mr. Knowles is an oceans
campaigner with Greenpeace International and has led Greenpeace’s ICCAT delegation. Id.
19
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Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna (ICCAT).29
ICCAT is the best known, and most widely criticized, of the Bluefin
intergovernmental bodies; it is commonly referred to derogatorily as the
“International Conspiracy to Catch All Tuna.”30 It was formed in 1969 and has
forty-eight member countries that agree on international regulations for Atlantic
Bluefin.31 Those countries typically meet once a year to set quotas on the number
of Bluefin allowed to be fished worldwide and distribute those quotas among
themselves.32 The quotas, however, are the source of much of ICCAT’s criticism.33
In 2008, ICCAT’s own scientists recommended a 15,000 metric ton catch limit on
Bluefin.34 Member countries instead voted to set the number at 23,000 metric
tons.35 Despite heavy backlash from environmental groups, this practice has
become commonplace; ICCAT again failed to follow the recommendations of its
own scientists in 2010, when it agreed to reduce the catch limit by only 600 tons
for the following year.36
High quotas would not be such a problem for the Atlantic Bluefin if they were
implemented properly, but ICCAT has notoriously poor enforcement standards. Dr.
Susan Lieberman of the Pew Environmental Group has stated that the amount of
Atlantic Bluefin caught yearly is likely twice as high as the agreed amount because
ICCAT has failed to ensure that member countries comply.37 Some ICCAT
members simply do not report their catch amounts, and 80 percent of ICCAT’s
records are missing the information used to determine which fish are legally or
illegally caught.38 Very few patrol boats or inspectors police the countries, and
many member nations are cash-strapped and do not have the means to enforce the
regulations they agree to.39 In the Mediterranean especially, fishermen flout rules
forbidding the use of spotter planes to identify tuna shoals,40 and some boats have
been accused of having ties to the Italian mafia.41 ICCAT rules also state that the
larger vessels must have an “independent observer” onboard, but this directive is

29

Id.
This pejorative appears to be widely used among environmental activists, although the
origins of the phrase are unclear. See, e.g., GLOBAL CATCH, supra note 1 (quoting sustainable
sushi restaurateur Casson Trenor); Brower, supra note 4; Estabrook, supra note 9 (quoting
Carl Safina of the Blue Ocean Institute).
31
SUSHI: THE GLOBAL CATCH, supra note 1.
32
Id.
33
See, e.g., id.; Brower, supra note 4 (discussing a report from ICCAT’s own scientists
that is highly critical of the agreed-on catch quotas).
34
Estabrook, supra note 9.
35
Id.
36
Timothy Hurst, Bluefin Tuna Get No Help from International Community,
ECOPOLITOLOGY (Nov. 27, 2010), http://ecopolitology.org/2010/11/27/bluefin-tuna-gets-nohelp-from-international-community/ [https://perma.cc/F7YA-MAKK].
37
Dr. Lieberman first asserted that Bluefin catches are likely twice as high as the set
quotas while in attendance at the 2009 ICCAT session. Estabrook, supra note 9. She has
since called for total suspension of Bluefin fishing. Id.
38
SUSHI: THE GLOBAL CATCH, supra note 1.
39
Id.
40
Greenberg, supra note 11.
41
Michael McCarthy, Is This the End of the Bluefin Tuna?, THE INDEPENDENT (Nov. 28,
2008), http://www.independent.co.uk/environment/nature/is-this-the-end-of-the-bluefintuna-1040246.html [https://perma.cc/2UW7-S4NW].
30
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largely ignored.42 The vessels, which have a capacity for much larger catches than
their governments have agreed to, often over-catch and under-report.43
After the backlash from the high catch limit set in 2008, ICCAT members voted
to begin a system of paper-based catch records that would help cut down on
Bluefin illegally entering the market by tracing fish to their final destinations.44 Six
years later, the gap between reported and total catches has only widened.45 An
investigation into trade data including European Union nation exports, Japanese
customs documents, and U.S. Department of Agriculture Foreign Agricultural
Service records revealed that 140 percent more fish are entering the market than are
being reported.46
Also in 2008, ICCAT commissioned an independent review of its policies. The
review called ICCAT’s stewardship an “international disgrace” and a “travesty of
fisheries management.”47 Following this dismal feedback, ICCAT researchers
reported that the Atlantic Bluefin merited inclusion on the U.N. CITES list of
international trade bans.48 Had CITES voted to include the Bluefin, it would have
fallen under the jurisdiction of the same body responsible for the protection of
critically endangered species like tigers, white rhinos, and giant pandas.49 Instead,
the vote failed at the United Nations, and CITES members delegated their authority
on the matter back to ICCAT.50
Despite its many failings, ICCAT has recently made more attempts to protect
the Bluefin. It has refused to grant amnesty to countries that have fished beyond
their allotted amounts; instead, ICCAT enacted a policy to slash offenders’ future
allotments.51 In 2011, it began to test a system that could electronically track

42

Richard Black, Med Bluefin Tuna Catch ‘Unabated,’ BBC (Oct. 18, 2011),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-15323370 [https://perma.cc/4K6XWRAX]. ICCAT appears to employ a third-party organization that provides Observers for
transshipment vessels in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans; the Observers are responsible for
monitoring longliners in ICCAT regions and checking vessel monitoring systems. See
“ICCAT Regional Observer Programme Manual,” INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE
CONSERVATION OF ATLANTIC TUNA, Nov. 2012, at 23, available at https://www.iccat.int/
Documents/ROP/ICCAT_Observer_Manual.pdf [https://perma.cc/M4GP-MJZH].
43
Black, supra note 42.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Brower, supra note 4.
48
Estabrook, supra note 9.
49
CITES has been relatively successful at establishing regulations to protect these other
critically endangered species. Failure to move Bluefin under its jurisdiction was generally
considered a serious blow to conservationists. Greenberg, supra note 11.
50
Id. Of the 129 CITES member countries, seventy-two voted against the ban, forty-three
voted in favor, and fourteen abstained. David Adam, Bluefin Fails to Make UN’s List of
Protected Fish, GUARDIAN (Mar. 18, 2010), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/
2010/mar/18/bluefin-tuna-un-cites [https://perma.cc/XW86-NTAZ]. Only the United States,
Kenya, and Norway supported the ban outright. Id. It was reported that the United Kingdom,
the Netherlands, and several other European countries voted in favor of the ban, against the
European Union’s official position. Id. Japan led the opposition, stating that it is concerned
about recovery, but ICCAT should be responsible for all Bluefin regulation. Id.
51
Bleak Future for Bluefin as Tuna Commission Only Marginally Trims Catches, WWF
GLOBAL (Nov. 27, 2010), http://wwf.panda.org/wwf_news/?197332/Tuna-Commission-failsagain-to-ensure-bluefin-tuna-recovery#.VzR0QQj6kN0 [https://perma.cc/25M4-UZ6M].
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caught fish from ocean to market, and it plans to revise its antiquated stockassessment protocols in 2015.52 ICCAT’s structure and governance, however,
remain unchanged, and in November of 2014, quotas were raised from 1750 tons in
2014 to 2000 tons in 2015 and 2016.53
It seems natural, then, to call on individual nations to protect Bluefin stocks.
Multinational bodies have shown a tendency to sacrifice quality decisions in favor
of simply brokering an agreement among nations with competing interests,54 and
accusations of vote-buying and political pressure among members are common.55
The organizations themselves have passed the buck back and forth, and even when
reasonable regulations are passed, the organizations lack the legal means to enforce
them.56 They are, essentially, at the mercy of member countries that often cannot or
will not ensure compliance back home. There is a total lack of individual
accountability; except for the most egregious violations, failures are mostly
attributed to the governing body as a whole.57
The United States and Japan are the obvious candidates for countries that could
prove to be more effective at protecting the Bluefin. Eighty percent of the world’s
Bluefin tuna passes through Japanese markets, and both commercial fishing and
demand for the species have increased massively since the beginning of America’s
sushi boom.58 Whether these countries can fill in where multinational bodies,
especially ICCAT, have failed is a question to be answered in the coming years.
II. MARKETS AND REGULATORY BODIES
Both the United States and Japan have the mechanisms in place to be able to
enforce stricter regulations on commercial Bluefin fishing and trade, especially in
the area of importation. The makeup of their relative markets also suggests that
properly enforced restrictions could be quite successful.
A. U.S. Regulations and Ability to Enforce
The U.S. government has made a concerted effort in recent years to regulate

52
Brower, supra note 4. ICCAT’s Working Group on Stock Assessment Methods met
from February 15–19, 2016, to discuss progress on Harvest Control Rules and how to
increase involvement with the Strategic Initiative on Stock Assessment Methods. See ICCAT
Circular #8526/2015, INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF ATLANTIC
TUNAS, Dec. 2015, available at https://www.iccat.int/Documents/8526-15_ENG.PDF
[https://perma.cc/K26U-GWVW].
53
Bluefin Tuna Catch Limits Increased to 2,000 Tonnes for 2015, CBC NEWS (Nov. 17,
2014), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/nova-scotia/bluefin-tuna-catch-limits-increased-to-2000-tonnes-for-2015-1.2837862 [https://perma.cc/MGE7-HTXP].
54
See supra notes 24–29 and accompanying text.
55
Cf. infra notes 154–156 (discussing Japan’s history of buying votes from Caribbean
nations in the International Whaling Commission, a similar widely criticized
intergovernmental marine regulatory body).
56
See generally supra notes 37–43, 47–50 and accompanying text.
57
The fact that ICCAT has been a lightning rod for criticism in the last few years
indicates that the larger organization is a convenient scapegoat for members’ failings.
Despite some nations contributing far more to overfishing than others, equal blame is
distributed through the governing body. See Greenberg, supra note 11.
58
Id.
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commercial fishing of Bluefin tuna. Atlantic Highly Migratory Species fisheries are
managed under the authority of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and
Management Act and the Atlantic Tunas Convention Act.59 Under the MagnusonStevens Act, the National Marine Fisheries Service (a branch of the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration colloquially referred to as “NOAA
Fisheries”) must manage fisheries to maintain continually optimum yield while
preventing overfishing.60 The Atlantic Tunas Convention Act was passed
specifically to ensure that sufficient means of regulation are in place to satisfy
ICCAT agreements by giving the Secretary of Commerce power to “promulgate
regulations necessary and appropriate to carry out ICCAT recommendations.”61
The Secretary of Commerce has since delegated that authority to NOAA’s
Assistant Administrator for Fisheries.62
NOAA Fisheries has historically been successful at enforcing regulations and
achieving its stated goals.63 In August of 2014, NOAA published new requirements
in a large amendment to its Bluefin management plan.64 These regulations stem
from a broader goal of meeting the catch quotas allotted to the United States by
ICCAT while restricting the time, place, and manner in which U.S. fisheries can
harvest that quota.65 Commercial fleets in the Gulf of Mexico can no longer target
the species, and while they can still harvest other types of fish in the Gulf, their
allotted amount of Bluefin bycatch—accidental killings of the fish when it is not
being targeted—will be lowered.66 Dead discards are accounted for in nations’
Bluefin allotments, and NOAA Fisheries has a stated goal of reducing the number
of dead Bluefin discards.67 Furthermore, video cameras must be installed on fishing
vessels in the Gulf and parts of the Atlantic coast to record full-time what is being
caught in an attempt to crack down on illicit fishing activity.68 These regulations
have been widely applauded and faced relatively little resistance from commercial
fishing vessels.69 Pew Charitable Trust’s ocean conservation unit recently praised
NOAA Fisheries for independently increasing Bluefin protections.70

59

Final Amendment 7 to the 2006 Consolidated Atlantic Highly Migratory Species
Fishery Management Plan, NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE, Aug. 2014, available at
http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/hms/documents/fmp/am7/final_amendment_7_to_the_2006_
consolidated_atlantic_highly_migratory_species_fishery_management_plan_8_28_2014_for
_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/7LZJ-UZ9D] [hereinafter Final Amendment 7].
60
See Final Amendment 7, supra note 59, at v.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
See infra notes 71–74 and accompanying text.
64
See generally Final Amendment 7, supra note 59.
65
Id. at v.
66
Id. at v–vi.
67
Id.
68
See id at 331. The requirement that commercial vessels in the Atlantic Tuna Longline
category have electronic monitoring systems onboard was effective June 1, 2015. See NOAA
Fisheries Announces Dates and Locations for Installation of Electronic Monitoring Systems,
NOAA FISHERIES, Dec. 2014, available at http://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/sfa/hms/news/
news_list/2014/12/a7_em_install_schdule_122314.html [https://perma.cc/4M3C-CL72]. NMFS
provided funds to pay for the equipment for certain vessels specified in Amendment 7. Id.
69
See generally infra Part III.A.
70
“NOAA Fisheries deserves great praise for significantly increasing protections for
bluefin….This historic action will help western Atlantic bluefin tuna rebuild to healthy
levels.” Banner Day for Bluefin, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, Aug. 29, 2014, available at

112

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL SUPPLEMENT

[Vol. 91:88

NOAA has its own Office of Law Enforcement, a federal police entity
responsible for enforcing domestic laws and international treaty requirements. It is
the sole federal agency tasked with enforcing NOAA regulations.71 While the
effects of the recent expansion of Bluefin protections in the Gulf of Mexico have
yet to be seen, regulations have been successful at decreasing Pacific Bluefin
catches.72 Recreational fishermen have had “spectacular” Bluefin fishing off the
coast of California in the last two years, indicating that those waters were
maintained properly after NOAA enforced protections.73 The Pacific Bluefin
fishery in the United States is one of the only fisheries in the world where
recreational catch sometimes exceeds commercial take; it seems that U.S.
commercial fisheries are in compliance with federal regulations, and NOAA is
enforcing its policies properly.74
B. Suggested Improvements and Potential for Success in the United States
In some areas, however, the United States certainly could stand to improve its
Bluefin protections. Since commercial Bluefin fishing took off in the last twenty
years or so, NOAA has failed to keep up with some aspects of overfishing. The
response to the 2010 BP oil spill was extremely slow; it took four years from the
time of the spill before NOAA passed any regulations on fishing Bluefin in the
Gulf, despite the knowledge that the spill heavily damaged Bluefin spawning
grounds.75
Furthermore, while NOAA has stated that it wishes to reduce Bluefin bycatch, it
has failed to place harsh regulations on longline fishing—one of the biggest
contributors to bycatch in general.76 Longlining involves casting a main line on the
surface or bottom of the water and placing baited hooks along it at certain intervals.
The main lines can be up to thirty miles long and contain thousands of hooks, often
resulting in bycatch.77 Many Bluefin become bycatch while fishing vessels longline
for Yellowfin, and by local law they are supposed to be returned to the sea.78
American fisheries tend to follow the regulation, but the Bluefin are often dead by
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/analysis/2014/08/29/banner-day-forbluefin [https://perma.cc/G46E-25WN] (statement of Lee Crockett, director of U.S. ocean
conservation for The Pew Charitable Trusts).
71
What We Do, NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION,
http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/ole/about/what_we_do.html [https://perma.cc/795Z-BE3P].
72
Jim Hendricks, Feds To Decide on Tighter Limits for Sport-Caught Bluefin Tuna,
SPORT FISHING MAGAZINE, Nov. 11, 2014, available at http://www.sportfishingmag.com/
blogs/pacific-currents/feds-decide-tighter-limits-sport-caught-pacific-bluefin-tuna
[https://perma.cc/E2NQ-P394].
73
Id. (discussing the necessity of additional regulation after a season of above-average
fishing indicated some amount of recovery for the species).
74
Id. For an example of proper enforcement of Amendment 7, see NOAA Fisheries
Announces the Application of the Individual Bluefin Quota Accounting Rules in the
Northeast Distant Area, NOAA FISHERIES (Nov. 2015), http://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/sfa/
hms/news/news_list/2015/11/111215_ned_ibq-use.htm [https://perma.cc/6FZA-R3WT]
(announcing that 25-metric-ton bycatch quota for Atlantic Bluefin had been met in the
Northeast Distant Area and requiring vessels in said area to implement Individual Bluefin
Quota program).
75
Greenberg, supra note 11.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id.
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the time they can be discovered and returned.79
It should be noted that despite the upswing in commercial fishing of Atlantic
Bluefin, Pacific Bluefin—imported from Japanese markets—are actually more
commonly served in American restaurants.80 Even though commercial fishing has
increased in the United States, it is still relatively small, and American fisheries do
not tend to catch more than their quotas.81 While America’s commercial fishing
certainly needs to be regulated, the country contributes far more to the worldwide
Bluefin crisis by increasing demand for the meat and importing from other poorly
regulated countries. Most American regulations, though, have to do with the act of
fishing itself and do not focus on importing only legally fished Bluefin.82
The U.S. government, and NOAA specifically, already have the mechanisms in
place to fill in the gaps in their policies. Artisanal fishing is one possible answer to
the problem of longlining. Methods such as harpooning and fish-and-reel result in
little to no bycatch, and NOAA could potentially offer subsidies to encourage such
techniques. In addition, regulations limiting longlines to a certain number of hooks
for Bluefin fishing vessels could reduce bycatch. The NOAA Office of Law
Enforcement almost certainly has the capacity to enforce such a regulation,
especially on the heels of the recently passed onboard video requirement.83
It is also likely that the United States has the capabilities to solve the
importation problem. In the documentary Jiro Dreams of Sushi, world-famous
sushi chef Jiro Ono suggests allowing only tuna of a certain size to be caught and
sold.84 This suggestion has been echoed by environmental groups, as it would
ensure that juveniles who have not had a chance to reproduce can remain in the
wild and would likely help stocks recover.85 As a nation that largely imports, the
United States could potentially place a ban on imports of fish under a certain size.
With a regulatory body like NOAA already in place to enforce such a ban, it could
have an effect worldwide. Such a policy could be costly and would likely be met
with uproar from exporting nations, but it is a potential solution that the United
States has the capabilities to implement successfully. In general, the makeup of
U.S. fishery regulation and enforcement bodies, and its past regulatory successes,
indicate that the country could be effective in areas where intergovernmental
Bluefin protection groups fail.
C. The Japanese Market and Regulatory Bodies
The Japanese Bluefin market is markedly different from the U.S. market.
Although Japan has also cut down on its own commercial fishing, it consumes
Bluefin meat in much greater quantities and is home to the largest fish market in

79

Id.
Paul Greenberg, Why Are We Eating Bluefin Tuna to Extinction?, GRIST.ORG (Nov. 19,
2011), http://grist.org/food/2011-11-19-why-are-we-eating-bluefin-tuna-to-extinction/
[https://perma.cc/G2UJ-XRS6] (discussing America’s role in the overfishing of Bluefin as a
consumer rather than as a commercial fishing entity).
81
Id.
82
See, e.g., supra notes 65–69 and accompanying text.
83
See Final Amendment 7, supra note 59.
84
JIRO DREAMS OF SUSHI (Sundial Pictures, 2011).
85
Id.
80

114

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL SUPPLEMENT

[Vol. 91:88

the world.86 Nearly every caught Bluefin tuna will, at some point, pass through
Japan.87 This access to the fish puts Japan in a position to be able to regulate the
trade, and the country seems to have the mechanisms in place to do so effectively.
Bluefin were not popular in Japan until the 1960s;88 Yellowfin meat was much
preferred before Japan’s export boom took place.89 Once Japan began sending its
goods to the West in large quantities, airlines noticed they were losing money by
sending back empty planes.90 One businessman had the idea to ship refrigerated
Atlantic Bluefin to Japan from the West, and it quickly became favored by sushi
chefs.91
Japan’s per capita seafood consumption is among the highest in the
industrialized world, and while the Japanese do not catch much Atlantic Bluefin
anymore, they do eat almost all of it.92 Much of their Atlantic Bluefin is imported
from the Mediterranean, where catching juveniles is frequent.93 The juvenile fish
are taken to ranches, where they undergo the fattening process and never
reproduce.94 These ranched fish are then almost exclusively sent to Japan, where 95
percent of tuna will end up in sushi restaurants.95
Nearly all of the fish imported into Japan go to the Tsukiji Fish Market in
Tokyo.96 It is the largest fish market in the world,97 where city officials oversee
auctions and wholesalers scout out fish for their customers. It is unlike any fish
market in the United States. Intermediate wholesalers in the Tsukiji Fish Market
have three jobs: skillfully evaluating the fish, skillfully breaking down the fish, and
maintaining food safety.98 They have licenses to buy the fish at auction and orders
to fill from customers who are mostly restaurant owners.99 The wholesalers bid
based on what the customer requires and what they think the customer will be
willing to pay.
Problems in the quality of the auctioned fish arise frequently, and the merchants
settle disputes in a “Tuna Court” created by the state.100 The court is fast and
inexpensive and follows the normal rules and procedures of a government
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ordinance.101 Conflicts that must be taken to court typically arise because a fish is
diseased, blemished, or generally worth less than the buyer expected.102 Instead of
using a “caveat emptor” model, merchants take 7000 claims each year to the Tuna
Court and demand that their winning bid be reduced.103
Such a court is simply not necessary in the United States, where the markets are
much smaller and fewer purchases are disputed.104 In the rare occurrence that there
is a conflict about a worse-than-expected fish, there is no formal dispute resolution
mechanism.105 Tuna Courts are entirely unique to Japan.106
Immediately after auction, buyers split open the fish to determine if the quality
is as expected.107 If there is a dispute, it must be brought to the Tuna Court on the
same day.108 Problems range from a fish being weighed incorrectly to being stored
incorrectly. When there is a defect, buyers assert a right to compensation and go to
the Tuna Court. The Court itself is only open in fifteen-minute increments, four
times a day.109 Its jurisdiction comes from a 1972 Tokyo Metropolitan Government
(TMG) ordinance; the TMG in turn has authority to pass such an ordinance from
Japan’s Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries.110
The Court requires that sellers allow pre-auction inspection.111 Most of the
buyers’ grievances, then, stem from essentially no-fault complaints: the buyer
claims that there was a gap between his expectations and the actual quality of the
purchase that resulted from defects that were virtually undiscoverable preauction.112 Five judges, with no legal training, inspect the fish brought in for
complaint.113 There is no formal hearing, and buyers do not give a reason for their
claims.114 The judges then independently write down their assessments of the value
of the fish and one of them compiles the judgments.115 This process typically takes
anywhere between fifteen seconds and two minutes.116 A single remedy is offered
to the buyers: the winning auction price is adjusted by an amount equal to 50
percent of the damage.117 By ordinance, the judges’ scores are averaged to come up
with this amount; instead of an exact calculation, the number is often ballparked.118
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D. Suggested Improvements and Potential for Success in Japan
Outside of the Tsukiji Fish Market, Japan has a mediocre track record for
enforcing regulations on the Bluefin trade, despite having massive access to the
fish. Japanese longliners were blamed for causing the stock of Atlantic Bluefin that
congregated near Brazil to collapse, and similar complaints have been lodged
against the Japanese for the overfishing of both Atlantic and Pacific Bluefin.119
Recently, Japan has shown more of a willingness to pass regulations protecting
Bluefin, and it remains to be seen whether those regulations will be enforced
successfully.120 If it were inclined, though, Japan could have a massive impact on
rebuilding Bluefin stocks. A size limit could likely be implemented more
successfully in Tsukiji than in the United States; nearly all caught Bluefin pass
through the market, the origins of the fish are easily traceable, and a court is
already in place.121 A fine for entering small fish into the market could be placed on
the importers, with the Tuna Court making the decisions on whether the fish is
small and juvenile. Such a system would not require any legal training from the
judges, and it is reasonable to think that it could work with the same speed and ease
as the quality conflicts.122 Some of the fish imported from the Mediterranean are
fattened in farms and would meet the size limit without having been able to
reproduce; however, the large, wild-caught fish are the most valuable. This creates
an incentive for fishermen to leave juveniles in the water. Such an incentive could
have a large impact on stock recovery, and Japan already has the mechanisms in
place to enforce it.
III. GOVERNMENT WILLINGNESS TO IMPLEMENT REGULATION
While both countries could successfully enforce regulations that would help
improve Bluefin stock worldwide, a major unanswered question is whether or not
they actually would. The United States has a relatively good track record of
backing strict Bluefin regulations and successfully implementing species-specific
fishing regulations.123 Japan, however, is notorious for failing to support overfished
species regulations;124 it has spoken out against Bluefin protection in the past and
has very publicly avoided international guidelines for whale and dolphin
hunting.125 While it is entirely possible that the United States might be willing to
take on some responsibility for protecting Bluefin in areas where multinational
organizations have failed, the same seems less likely, though not impossible, for
Japan.
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A. U.S. Attitudes Toward Bluefin and Other Species-Specific Regulation
Although the United States has a history of overfishing certain species, it also
tends to implement proper regulations to protect those species. For example, in the
1980s, Americans overfished striped bass, a species native to North America.126
Consumer pressure to protect the bass became political, and “draconian limits,”
catch moratoria, and size requirements were imposed with little resistance and
much success.127
While the United States certainly contributes its share to overfishing, it does not
tend to mount an opposition when experts say protections are needed.128 For
Bluefin specifically, the United States has encouraged multinational bodies to pass
stronger protections for years. In 2010, it backed the inclusion of Bluefin on the
CITES list of non-traded species because ICCAT did not mandate a sufficiently
low quota, according to assistant Interior Secretary for Fish and Wildlife and Parks
Tom Strickland.129 He has also criticized ICCAT for its inability to ensure
compliance from member nations.130 In September 2013, Asia-Pacific fishing
nations agreed to reduce catch amounts for Bluefin tuna aged three and younger by
15 percent of the average catch amounts between 2002 and 2004.131 At that
meeting, the United States had proposed and lobbied for a 25 percent decrease, but
was later outvoted by Japan’s voting bloc.132
Americans themselves also seem quite willing to comply with regulations on
threatened fish; when NOAA Fisheries proposed lowering the recreational catch
limit on Pacific Bluefin, it was met with little resistance from American sport
fishermen.133 Even though actual catches were already lower than the catch limits
in place and the idea that “the plight of the Pacific Bluefin is not of our making”
was a prevailing attitude, fishermen showed a willingness to comply with the lower
recreational quotas.134 Sustainable sushi restaurants are now popping up on the
West coast, where sushi enthusiasts have started to demand more information about
the fish used in their food.135
In general, both the U.S. government and U.S. citizens have shown a historical
willingness to implement and comply with species-specific fishing regulations when
certain stocks are being overfished.136 It is reasonable to assume that the same
consideration will be given to Bluefin in the future, especially in the wake of the
stricter commercial Bluefin fishing requirements passed by NOAA in December of
2014.137 The United States, then, likely has both the ability and the willingness to act
in place of multinational governments in protecting Bluefin stocks.
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B. Japanese Attitudes Toward Bluefin and Other Species-Specific Regulation
Japan does not share America’s largely uneventful history of implementing
species-specific fishing regulations. Instead, it is notorious worldwide for its
aggressive fishing of threatened species, especially dolphins and whales.138
Japan is a member of the International Whaling Commission (IWC), which was
set up in 1946 to protect cetaceans, including dolphins and whales, from
overfishing.139 In 1982, whale stocks were so depleted that the IWC passed an
international moratorium on the commercial fishing of all whale species.140 Despite
this ban, activists have clashed with Japanese whalers as recently as 2013.141
Exploiting a loophole in the IWC moratorium that allows nations to issue
“scientific permits,” Japan hunts approximately 850 minke whales annually as part
of a “research whaling” campaign and has killed nearly 14,000 whales for
“research purposes” since the moratorium began.142 In spite of this, the IWC’s
scientific community found that Japan’s research has yet to achieve any stated
objectives.143
Originally, it appeared that Japan’s incentive was to restart commercial whaling,
an industry that used to be quite lucrative.144 A recent report that attempted to
disprove the claim that whaling is a cultural and nutritional necessity for Japan,
however, found that whale meat popularity was a postwar anomaly that Japan is
simply trying to make profitable again.145 Demand for whale meat in Japan has
been decreasing in recent years, especially among young people; 89 percent of
Japanese citizens have not bought whale meat in the last year.146 Consumption of
whale meat is at one percent of its peak in the 1960s.147 The government, however,
still subsidizes its whaling fleet and its Institute of Cetacean Research and has
diverted 2.28 billion yen148 from funds helping communities after the 2011 Miyagi
Earthquake to support “research whaling, stabilization promotion and
countermeasure expenses.”149
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Between 2011 and 2012, the whaling industry attempted to boost income and
reduce stockpiles by holding a series of whale meat auctions.150 Seventy-five
percent of the meat went unsold, and schools are now being used to shift stockpiles
of unsold whale meat.151 Despite this, the Japanese government has made no
indication that it will back off anytime soon. It continues to provide the industry
with generous loans and has stated that it intends to maintain its whaling fleet for
the next decade.152
The government’s attitude toward dolphin hunts is similar, despite international
outcry about overfishing and inhumane practices. The IWC should be the body in
charge of regulating dolphin hunting, but Japan has repeatedly blocked attempts to
restrict its practices, claiming that the IWC doesn’t have the competency to deal
with small cetaceans.153 Japan has been accused of paying bankrupt Caribbean
nations to join the IWC and vote for the Japanese agenda.154 Moreover, the
Japanese government has built multi-million dollar fishery complexes on every
island in the Eastern Caribbean.155 Some Caribbean environmentalists have stated
that the area is becoming a “neon-lit whorehouse” for the Japanese dolphin-hunting
agenda.156
Of particular concern is the annual dolphin hunt in Taiji, Japan, where
thousands of dolphins are killed each year for their meat.157 Environmental groups
that offered money to the local fishermen in Taiji to end their dolphin hunt were
turned down because the fishermen conduct the hunt for “pest control.”158 The
Japanese government posits that dolphins need to be killed because they are eating
too many other fish, a statement that the British IWC delegation said was “hard to
take seriously” and the Brazilian IWC delegation said amounts to “biological
nonsense.”159
Another reason offered by the government is that killing and eating dolphins is
part of Japanese culture.160 In larger cities, however, consuming dolphin meat is
unheard of because of its high mercury content.161 The meat is so undesirable that it
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is often mislabeled as whale meat to be sold in Japanese markets.162
Japan’s practices in whale and dolphin hunting seem to raise a single question:
Why? Neither industry is particularly profitable, the meat itself is not in high
demand, and the practices are a “persistent irritant”163 for Japan’s relations in
international forums. The government does not even seem interested in putting
forth believable explanations for its actions. Some scientists speculate that Japan is
attempting to keep the whale and dolphin markets alive because it is concerned
about running out of other fish.164 Atherton Martin, a former Dominican
representative of the IWC, posited the theory that Japan’s actions are based on
“misplaced national pride” that has to do with “remnants of a traditional notion of
empire.”165 Essentially, he says that Japan’s whale and dolphin hunts are a reaction
to being tired of the West demanding that Japan conform to certain standards. This
is supported by the executive director of Greenpeace Japan’s belief that Japanese
propaganda characterizes whaling as a “cultural conflict pitting Japan against
outsiders.”166
Regardless of the reasons why, it is almost undeniable that the Japanese
government has shown a reluctance to pass its own species-specific fishing
regulations. If the “traditional notion of empire” theory is correct, however, then
Bluefin may still have a chance in Japan because of the relatively newfound
popularity and high economic value of Bluefin. Tuna sushi did not exist in Japan
until 1800; fish with red flesh were originally looked down upon because of how
quickly they spoil, according to sushi historian Masuo Yoshino.167 The Japanese
government does not seem to have made statements about Bluefin fishing and
consumption being part of Japanese culture, and the fish may be sufficiently unlike
dolphins and whales to solicit a different government reaction. Furthermore,
Bluefin are far more profitable in Japan than the dolphin and whaling industries,
giving both the government and the people a major incentive to ensure its survival.
In September of 2014, Japan announced that it planned to halve its catch of
Pacific Bluefin in 2015, with the intention of reducing catches of juveniles.168
Some newspapers also reported that Japan thought previous cuts agreed to
internationally were insufficient, and the government was encouraging other
nations to adopt their own cuts.169 Although Japan’s history of species-specific
regulation indicates that the country might be unwilling to make up for failures in
intergovernmental Bluefin protection, it is also entirely possible that Bluefin have a
unique market that the government would be willing to protect.
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CONCLUSION
Despite totally different makeups, both the American and Japanese Bluefin
markets have the mechanisms in place to allow the countries to successfully
implement regulations on size and fishing methods. While the governments have
taken completely opposite approaches to species-specific regulation in the past, it is
still feasible that both will be willing to pass and enforce these regulations, as both
have very recently changed their policies independent of any encouragement from
multinational entities. Based on the size of the two countries’ markets, this bodes
well for the future of Bluefin tuna.
The governments themselves, however, cannot be relied on to fix this
worldwide problem. The populations of the two countries will likely be called on in
the future to contribute to the solution, as they have one thing in common: a
seemingly insatiable appetite for Bluefin tuna. It is hardly a question that the
populations of each country will be encouraged to eat more responsibly in the
future. Whether the consumers, like their governments, will be able and willing to
do so has yet to be determined.

